"THE DUNFERMLINE JOURNAL"
SATURDAY, JUNE 8, 1895 _____________________
A KINNEDDAR PIT ON FIRE. TWO MEN KILLED AND EIGHT INJURED
Terrible Destruction of Colliery
Plant.
The preparations which were being made by the
miners of Fife, for the celebration next week of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the eight hours a day system of working in the
mines, received yesterday a terrible check by an accident, which
occurred at the Fifeshire Main Company's pits at Kinneddar,
through which two men were killed, eight men injured, and a great
loss sustained through the destruction of colliery plant. The
Fifeshire Mains Company's works are situated at the foot of the
Saline Hills, about four miles from the burgh of Dunfermline, and
the colliery consists of two pits - an upcast and a downcast shaft
- which are separated from each other by not more than thirty
yards. Both shafts are sunk to the Lochgelly splint seam, a depth
of about sixty fathoms, and because of the brittle nature of the
metals passed through the pits are lined from top almost to the
bottom with strong wooden beams. The air in the mines is quickened
by a rarefying furnace which is built in the Jersey seam about
eleven fathoms up the upcast shaft. The pits are worked on the
double shift system - one shift commencing operations at seven
o'clock in the morning, while the men engaged in the second
shift are lowered at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. One hundred
and eighteen men were lowered at seven o'clock, yesterday and
all seems to have gone well during the day until a few minutes
before three o'clock when the fore shift men began to ascend
and the back shift men began to assemble on the pithead. At this
hour
An Unusual Volume of Smoke
was observed coming up the upcast shaft, and the
men on the pithead at once came to the conclusion that something
was wrong. Before they had thought long over probable theories as
to the dense smoke, Mr John Coupar, the underground manager,
arrived on the pithead, and announced that the woodwork of the
upcast shaft had caught fire in the vicinity of the furnace. Mr
Calderwood, the general manager, who had just arrived at the scene,
at once grasped the situation, and with his undermanager leapt on
to the cage and descended the downcast shaft. Mr Calderwood and Mr
Coupar were in the seat of the fire in little more than a couple of
minutes, and they found that a number of men, including Alexander
Thomson, the night inspector, were bravely trying to cope with the
burning by pouring water on the flames. The flames were by this
time roaring furiously a considerable distance up the shaft, and Mr
Calderwood at once came to the conclusion that the water which
could be carried in vessels by even an increased squad of men could
have no effect on the burning. He accordingly drafted the men to
different points in the air courses and started them on the work of
stopping in the hope of being able to cut off the air from the
rarefying shaft. Meantime, care was taken to dispatch messengers
for the men engaged at the coal face, and within a few minutes all
the men, with the exception of those actively engaged in the
extinguishing work, had been got to the surface. After making a
journey through the lower workings to see that the stopping work
was being carried on effectively, Mr Calderwood entered the cage of
the downcast shaft with a view of being raised to the higher
bottom. Through some little mistake or another he was raised to the
surface. The cage was lowered without delay, and a squad of men
came to the pit bank to announce that they had been completely
beaten off by the flames, the repeated falls of debris down the
upcast shaft having completely changed the air current. With such
fury had the flames turned upon the men that some of them were
badly burned about the face and hands. The cage was again lowered
with all possible speed, and in a few seconds a second batch of the
extinguishers had arrived on the pithead to tell the same story.
Some of the second batch of men also bore marks of the terrible
position in which they had been placed. An enquiry on the part of
the general manager brought out the fact that two men, namely,
Frank Sharp (61), a miner residing at Comrie Village, and a
relative named Thomas Sharp (25), also residing in Comrie Village,
were amissing. When this discovery was made, the smoke was issuing
from all parts of the pit, and the cages even in the downcast shaft
stood in a dense volume of smoke. A slight clearance was effected
by rushing a large volume of water from the pumps down the mine,
and Mr Calderwood got on the cage, calling for volunteers who were
prepared to descend the shaft. He very soon had John Coupar, the
underground manager, and John Hynd, the night fireman, by his side,
and the three men descended to the Jersey or upper seam where it
was known the men had been employed at the blocking up work. No
trace of the missing men could be found, and a second descent of
the same explorers was as futile as the first. Further assurances
having been given that the Sharps had been seen in the mine at a
late stage of the work, a third descent was made - but this time
the explorers went to the lowest seam. On reaching the bottom they
were horrified to find the two men lying on the plates - the
unfortunate men having
In Scrambling About In The Dark
fallen from the Jersey seam to the Lochgelly
splint down the shaft, a distance of eleven fathoms. On the two men
being brought to the surface it was found that life was extinct -
the injuries sustained by the fall having been of such a nature as
to cause instantaneous death. The bodies having been dispatched to
the respective homes of the poor men, attention was directed
towards the injured who, meantime, had been accommodated in the
colliery office. It was found that the following were all suffering
from burns of a more or less serious nature: - Alexander Thomson,
Blackhouse, Oakley; William McKenna, Torryburn; Lockhart Bleloch,
Comrie Village; John Hunter, Comrie; George Ramage. Oakley; Thomas
Hunter, Comrie; George Bell, Oakley; and Alexander Short, Oakley.
Telephone messages were dispatched to Dunfermline, and in a
remarkable brief space of time the most of the injured men had been
removed to Dunfermline Cottage Hospital. The dead and injured
removed, Mr Calderwood and a large squad of men were able to turn
their attention on the work of attempting to extinguish the
burning. Short as the space of time had been from the time the
smoke was noticed, the burning had made terrible progress in the
upcast shaft, and the flames were issuing from the mouth of the
shaft - fifty feet from the actual seat of the fire. The pithead
frame soon caught fire, and shortly after the flames had begun to
rise the height of sixty feet above the pit mouth, the huge wooden
frame fell a total wreck, some of the burning planks going reeling
down the shaft. The pithead fittings also caught fire and
communicated the burning to the winding engine house. The wire rope
became all tangled and twisted, and before many minutes had passed
the winding drum stood a naked frame. The winding coupling engines,
which were of the most approved type, were much damaged by the
fire. Seeing that it was hopeless to attempt to extinguish the
burning by ordinary methods, Mr Calderwood and his staff of men
closed the mouth of the now ruined upcast shaft, stopped the
pumping engine in the downcast shaft, and dampened down the
downcast shaft. At the hour of writing the heat was intense at the
mouth of the upcast shaft, and at repeated intervals huge rumblings
took place, which indicated the work of destruction in the upcast
was complete. Everything pointed to the conclusion that the metals
had caught fire in the vicinity of the upcast shaft. The flow of
water is from three hundred to four hundred gallons per minute, but
the workings in the two seams extend to such a distance that a
considerable time must elapse before the water can reach the seat
of the fire. Hopes are entertained, however, that the damping down
expedients resorted to will retard the burning to such an extent
that the water will have risen before greater damage has been done
to the general workings. Meantime upwards of two hundred men are
thrown idle.
Interviews.
In an interview with one of our representatives,
Mr Calderwood said that he grasped the situation as soon as he came
forward and noticed the dense volume of smoke issuing from the
upcast shaft. The destruction of the woodwork in the shaft and the
gearing of the pit was the work of a few minutes. The men made
rapid progress with the stopping he had started them upon, and if
they had only got a little more time, there can have been little
doubt but the extinguishing work would have soon reduced the fury
of the burning.
One of the men engaged at the work of stopping
says: - "After we had proceeded a short time with our work, a
tremendous fall of rubbish came down the upcast shaft and drove the
flames out upon us. Our lamps were blown out and the air current
became changed. Feeling we were in great danger of losing our
lives, all the squad at once began to scramble in the dark to the
bottom of the upcast shaft. We found our way by running our hands
along the signal wire of the roadway. It was with great difficulty
some of us managed to scramble to the bottom. The pain from the
burns was intense."
An eye-witness says: - "I have never seen a
fire burn with such fury. Within ten minutes of the discovery of
the burning, the upcast shaft had become a burning funnel, and in
little more than an hour, the shaft and gearing had become a total
wreck. Because of the enormous height of the pithead frame, it was
dangerous to go within 50 yards of the upcast
shaft."
Another eye-witness says: - "I could
compare the burning in the shaft to nothing but a huge blast
furnace, and I have seen nothing approaching the scene after the
pithead frame and the engine house had taken fire."
Large crowds of people visited the scene of the
fire in the course of the evening - Mr Weir, the miners secretary,
putting in an early appearance. In the villages where the men
engaged in the pits were resident, great excitement
prevails.
LATEST DETAILS. TWO DEATHS IN THE HOSPITAL
OTHER MEN CRITICAL.
Saturday, 1 a.m.
A visit to Dunfermline Cottage Hospital at one
o' clock this morning showed that the catastrophe was much more
serious than was first anticipated. All the injured, with the
exception of Lockhart Bleloch, were removed to the hospital, and at
a glance the doctors who had been summoned - nearly all the
Dunfermline medical men were soon in the building - saw that at
least six of the seven men brought in were in anything but a
comfortable state. John Hunter (30) and Alex Thomson (35) were
indeed found to be in an extremely critical state, and before 12
o'clock had been struck both men had succumbed to their
injuries. So badly were their faces charred that the poor men were
beyond recognition before the end came.
Late - At 1.30 o'clock another of the men
was reported to be sinking fast, and two of his comrades showed
symptoms which could not fail to give the gravest cause for alarm.
Nearly all the medical men have been on duty the whole night, and
the hospital staff have not had a single moments rest.
ANOTHER TWO DEATHS.
Later - Saturday, 2 a.m.
On inquiry at the hospital at 2 a.m., we were
informed that another two of the men, George Ramage and Thomas
Hunter, had died - making six deaths in all. The condition of the
other three men in the hospital had become much more critical -
convulsions having supervened.
THE CONDITION OF THE OTHER THREE
MEN.
Latest - 2.30
In the course of a conversation at this hour, Dr
Dow stated that he found that some of the men must have inhaled
heated particles of dust, which had the effect of accelerating
death. Several of the men had vomited black matter. The immediate
cause of death, however, had been exhaustion and the extensive
surface covered by the burns - heads, faces, and bodies being
terribly scorched. The three men who are still alive are in an
extremely critical state. One of them, at least, cannot survive
many hours.
----------------------------------------------
THE DUNFERMLINE JOURNAL
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1895. THE KINNEDDAR COLLIERY DISASTER.
__________
THE PUBLIC INQUIRY.
The public inquiry was resumed in the
Dunfermline Sheriff Courthouse on Tuesday into the cause of the
burning accident, by which nine men lost their lives at the
Fifeshire Main Coal Company's works at Kinneddar on 31st May
last. Seven of the men, it will be remembered, were fatally burned
while employed cutting off the air current from the burning upcast
shaft, while the other two men were killed by falling from one seam
to another in attempting to make their escape up the downcast
shaft. The Commissioner was Mr J. Comrie Thomson, advocate,
Edinburgh, and the Assessor Mr J. B. Atkinson, H. M. Inspector of
Mines. The Mine owners were represented by Mr C. J. Guthrie,
advocate, instructed by Mr A. Guthrie, S. S. C; and Mr A. J. Young,
advocate, instructed by Mr Jas. Currie Macbeth, solicitor,
Dunfermline, Fife and Kinross Miners' Association. Mr McFarlane
was present representing the Crown. Mr Weir was also present along
with Mr Robert Smillie, President of the Scottish Miners'
Federation; Mr William Parrot, Yorkshire, and Mr George Hancock,
Nottingham, members of the British Federation Executive.
____________________
TUESDAY'S EVIDENCE.
A COLLIERY MANAGER'S EVIDENCE.
James Ritchie, manager, Gartness Colliery,
Airdrie who was the first witness examined, deponed in answer to Mr
Guthrie: - I have been manager of Gartness Colliery for eight
years, and have been connected with mining for 25 year. I have been
shown a plan and model of the Fifeshire Main Colliery, and my
attention has been directed specially to the fact that there had
been a furnace at No. 3 shaft. Cubes when properly looked after
constitute a fairly safe arrangement. After the pits are fully
developed a fan is generally adopted instead of a cube. Cubes are
put down sometimes as a temporary arrangement until the workings
are fully developed. There is always danger connected with the use
of cubes; but when the cubes are properly looked after there is not
so much danger. The safety or danger of a cube such as was in
operation at Kinneddar would depend on how the cube was used. In
what I have said I have kept in view the fact that the fire bars
and a fire lamp were in use in addition to the cube. Mr
Calderwood's plan of putting a stopping into the workings,
after the fire broke out, was a wise one. If there were plenty of
men and plenty of material the stopping should have been erected
within three quarters of an hour. Other methods of extinguishing
the fire might have been adopted - closing the mouths of the shafts
after the men had been brought to the surface. I know nothing that
could have enabled Mr Calderwood to have foreseen what took place.
I should have expected that the stopping would have been completed
before any substantial fall of debris would have taken place in the
burning shaft. A ventilation registering 20,000 cubic feet per
minute seems to me to be fairly good for the number of men employed
in the pits.
By Mr Young - The cause of the accident was the
reversion of the air current, and the cause of that must have been
the giving way of the lining of the shaft. The lining fell on
account of the fire. The fire must have been caused by either
flames or sparks from the cube.
Would it not have been safer to have had the
cube further back from the shaft? I have known cases of fire where
the cube was 20 or 40 yards away from the shaft. Possibly it might
have been safer if the cube had been further away but I cannot say
positively. I do not remember ever finding a cube, an open fire
place, and a fire lamp all used together for ventilating
purposes.
Don't you think that the risk from fire
would be greatly increased by the use of the open fire-place and
the fire-lamp? - The larger the fireplace the greater the draught,
and the greater would have been the tendency to set fire to the
shaft. I would have had an open fire-place if I had thought it
necessary to increase the ventilation, but not if I had considered
it dangerous. It was an element of consideration that the shaft was
timbered throughout and that the roof of the bottom was also
timbered. The presence of the fire would dry the timber and make it
more inflammable.
If you had been in Mr Calderwood's place
would you have adopted the plan of putting in a stopping? - I think
I would have done that. On the spur of the moment it was a rather
prudent thing to do.
Supposing you had known that the shaft was in
flames from top to bottom would you have ordered the men to put in
a stopping? If I had thought I had time to erect a stopping I would
have done it.
Which end would it serve to put in a stopping? -
It would stop the current of air and extinguish the
fire.
Had the fire in the shaft not done as much harm
as it could have done? - No. I have known a shaft on fire and the
flames coming out of the mouth of the shaft. When the fire was
extinguished it was found that the timber remained sufficient for
its purpose, as only the skin of the timber had been burned. The
fire might have been extinguished by stopping the mouths of the
shafts; but before this plan was attempted the men would require to
be all out of the mine. Had I been on the ground I would have
adopted the plan of stopping adopted by Mr Calderwood.
Would you have adopted that course even although
you had known that the upcast shaft was on fire? - If I had thought
that there was time to put in a stopping.
If you had known that the shaft was wholly on
fire would you have put in a stopping such as Mr Calderwood did? -
Well, the shaft being on fire I certainly would have taken the
precaution of putting in a stopping and trying to cut off the air
current.
Re-examined by Mr Guthrie - To station a man at
the furnace and furnish him with a supply of water were just the
precautions which would have been taken to prevent fire. It is not
possible to judge accurately of the strength and position of the
fan until the workings had been developed to a considerable extent.
It is quite a usual thing to adopt a temporary expedient until the
workings are developed. The fact that the flames were in the shaft
did not necessarily indicate that the shaft was on fire from top to
bottom.
By Mr Atkinson - I have had experience of a few
cases of fire.
In the case of the Kinneddar an open fire was
built on the day of the accident, and within a few hours after the
open fire was lit the woodwork of the shaft was on flames - do you
consider that the building of this open fire indicated a lack of
judgement? - Well, it would depend upon the surroundings and the
precautions taken. It might have been a lack of cautiousness at the
fire.
Mr Comrie Thomson - The fire was attributable to
some cause. I suppose it come to this that the fire got too strong
or was too near the timber.
By Mr Atkinson - Do you think that there was a
lack of caution in looking after the fire or in building the open
fire? - There may have been a want of caution in looking after the
fire.
A MINING ENGINEER'S EVIDENCE.
John Watson Ormiston, mining engineer, Glasgow,
questioned by Mr Guthrie, deponed that for two years he had been
consulting engineer to the Fifeshire Main Colliery. He had examined
the plan and model. He had no fault to find with a cube as a
temporary arrangement. In the present case the cube was used for a
temporary purpose, because it had not yet been settled where the
permanent fan was to be placed. The workings were not fully
developed to make it possible to say what size of fan should be
used or where it should be placed. He found no reason to find fault
with the size of the cube or its position. If black damp were found
in the pit the day before the accident there was no objections to
adding to the heat by means of an additional fire upon the bars,
provided a screen of bricks and a covering had been erected to
deflect the heat or flames into the shaft. It was natural to
expect, if there was no covering, that the heat and flames would
ascend and attack the wooden roof above. The plan of erecting a
stopper where the manager put it, so as to shut off the air from
the fire was the method that witness himself would have adopted. If
there was no material suitable for closing over the pit mouth, the
quickest course was that adopted. He would not have anticipated a
reversal of the air current. He would not have expected such a
considerable fall of debris as would have reversed the current. He
was taking into account the nature of the strata, and the fact that
the timber was fresh. From the statement of the circumstances made
to him by Mr Calderwood, witness thought he would have acted just
as Mr Calderwood had done.
By Mr Young - The pit was in ordinary working
order. He was consulted by the manager about various matters
connected with the pit, and long prior to the accident it was
explained to him that it was intended to erect a ventilating fan.
That was his impression; he was not positive about it. He was not
consulted as to the erection of a fan. The position of the fan
would be at the end of the upcast shaft, but he understood it had
not been settled which was to be the permanent upcast shaft. It had
been suggested that there should be another shaft which would have
been the permanent upcast shaft. He considered in the
circumstances, especially in view of the wood above, that a brick
screen and covering at the open fire would have been a necessary
and ordinary precaution. He would not have allowed a fire without a
covering, when there was wood above, but his experience made him
more careful in this respect than many. The two pit bottomers at
No. 2 pit were not sufficient to look after the fire. Men ought to
be told off to do nothing but watch it.
By Mr Guthrie - A pit bottomer would have been a
quite suitable person to watch the fire if he did nothing else to
do.
Supposing the fireman was told specially to look
after the fire, would that have been the kind of precaution you
would have expected? - Yes.
By Mr Atkinson - The fan was preferred because
with it they got a very speedy current of air, and there was no
risk of fire.
CUBES OR FANS.
Alexander Simpson, mining engineer, Glasgow,
deponed - In former years the cube was used as a means of
ventilation. In such districts as Fifeshire, where there is little
or no gas in the workings, it is usual to employ cubes until it is
settled where the fan should be situated; but in Lanarkshire, where
there is a good deal of gas, we do not like to use cubes at all.
Assuming that the cube was properly attended to, I should not have
anticipated any danger at Kinneddar. The usual mode of getting quit
of black damp was to increase the ventilation; and if black damp
had been discovered at Kinneddar the day before the accident, it
was right to try to increase the current of air by increasing the
heat. If the fire put down on iron bars near the cube was not a
particularly large one, I should not have anticipated any danger,
looking at the space and the ignitable matter. If the fireman had
been told to keep a watch and a plentiful supply of water was kept
close by, I should not have thought that there was any probability
of danger. The fire lamp was a very small thing, and could not have
increased the danger of combustion to any extent. I am of opinion
that Mr Calderwood acted wisely in proceeding to put in the
stopping he did in the hope of cutting off the air current. It
would have been exceedingly dangerous, indeed madness, to have
proceeded to stop up the mouths of the shafts while the men were in
the pit.
By Mr Young - My information about the facts of
the case is mainly derived from the report of the last day's
proceedings in a Dunfermline paper. I had a talk with Mr Calderwood
this morning. The fire must have been caused by sparks or something
from the cube or the open fire. A man watching the fire could so
regulate it as to prevent sparks rising. The reason why the fan is
preferred to the cube is because with the former there is no danger
of fire, and it produces a much more satisfactory ventilation. In
the long run, in a pit which requires a good deal of ventilation,
the fan is the cheaper expedient. It is not usual to erect a fan
which involves considerable outlay until the conditions of the
workings are understood, but a fan is generally erected at the
first where a good deal of gas is evolved in the colliery. The
expense of the fan is incurred rather than run the risk arising
from gases. If it be the case as I am informed, that the nearest
woodwork was 13 feet from the cube, and there being so much space
around, I should not expect mischief to have followed. Apart from
what occurred in the present instance, I should not have found
fault with the arrangements, but I now, after what has happened,
say that they might have been better. I do not consider from
November 1894 to May 1895 an extraordinary long time in which to
use the cube before fixing the position of a fan, particularly if
it be the case as I am informed, that the owner had some
anticipation of a fault being come upon between No. 1 and No. 3
pits. I cannot recall any instance of having seen fire-lamp, and
open furnace, and a cube used together, but it seems to me a
natural thing that the ventilation should be increased by such
expedients when black damp is found in the pits. Even if the
timbering of the shaft had been got hold of by the fire it was a
wise thing to put a stopper where it was erected. It would not have
occurred to me that it was probable that the debris in the shaft
would fall or that something would occur to reverse the current. I
think the decision of the stopping was quite consistent with the
probable safety of the men. It was quite right to withdraw the men
from the pits, but it seems to me it was a practical thing to get
the men to erect the stopping so as to save the property. If an
attempt had been made to close the mouth of No. 3 shaft it is quite
possible that part of the surface would have given way and the men
falling down and been killed. There was danger either way, but I
should have done what the manager did.
A MINER'S NARROW ESCAPE.
John Hind, fireman, stated that he had been
employed at the Fifeshire Main Colliery for about two years and was
there at the time of the accident. He went on duty at 3 p.m. and
left off work at 11 p.m. It was part of his duty to attend to the
cube, which was kept going night and day. He never heard any
complaints about the ventilation or the furnace. He never saw any
sign of fire about the wood near the furnace. When he went to the
pit at 3 p.m. on the day of the accident to start work he noticed
extra smoke coming out of No. 3 shaft. Cooper told him to put some
planks across the mouth of the shaft. Witness put one or two planks
across, but the smoke was coming up in such dense volumes that they
had to desist. Witness afterwards went down No. 2 pit with George
Bell, who was killed. Witness was at the place where the stopping
was being erected and was sent to another part of the pit for
shovels. After he had gone some distance he heard a noise as of
something falling in No. 3 shaft. He returned, and on his way back
towards the stopping he was met by some smoke. He saw no flame. By
the time he reached the pit bottom the injured men had been taken
up. When he first went down the shaft he did not think there was
any danger. He never thought that anything would fall down the
shaft and reverse the air current. The other men did not seem to
have any anticipation of danger either.
By Mr Young - Cooper, the underground manager
asked him to put the planks across the mouth of No. 3 shaft a few
minutes after the fire broke out. The men had not been withdrawn
from the pit at that time.
By Mr Atkinson - When he went along with George
Bell towards No. 3 shaft he saw some small pieces of burning timber
falling from the roof.
ANOTHER ESCAPE - PRESSURE ON THE CARS.
John Duff, miner, in answer to Mr Guthrie
deponed - I have been employed at mining for 20 years. I was on the
backshift at Kinneddar Colliery and arrived at the pithead on the
day of the accident at 2.30 p.m. At that time there was more smoke
than usual coming up the upcast shaft; but not enough to attract
particular attention. About twenty minutes after that, however, the
smoke became heavy, and a boy arrived on the pithead and stated
that he had been sent for canvas to use as a screen for keeping
back smoke. Immediately after this Mr Calderwood and Mr Cooper
arrived on the pithead from the bottom of No. 2 pit, and ordered
the men to fetch wood because they intended to put in a stopping.
The wood was put on to the cage and Mr Calderwood, and Mr Cooper,
and another two men and I descended the shaft to put in the
stopping. We had not got far on with the work when it was found
that we would need clay. George Ramage, Bell, and I, were
dispatched for clay to another part of the workings. Ramage and
Bell were both fatally injured. While I was engaged at the clay a
boy cried to run. I got to the surface all right.
By Mr Young - When a boy came up the pit and at
first announced that the upcast shaft was on fire, I called to the
pitheadman to get the men up first and foremost. That was before I
went down with Mr Calderwood. Just as Mr Calderwood gave the order
for us to go and get clay I heard a roar in the upcast shaft as if
the flames were making headway.
By Mr Atkinson - Before the boy called to run,
while clay was being put into the hutches I noticed that a change
had taken place in the air current. The air seemed to be going in
both ways, and it made such a pressure on the ears as to make me
think that my head was going to burst. I thought that something was
wrong; but I did not stop work until the boy called to
me.
THE GENERAL MANAGER RECALLED.
Robert Calderwood, general manager, who was
examined at great length at a previous sitting of the court was
recalled and answered a number of questions on the closing of the
mouths of the shafts after the men had been all got to the surface.
The splint seam had only been working a few months previous to the
accident. The fan on No. 1 pit was not sufficient for the whole
colliery, and we had to decide where a fan which would ventilate
the whole colliery should be placed. The erection of a fan was in
contemplation. There had been a suggestion to the effect that there
was a fault between No. 1 and the other pits; and it was only in
April that a roadway was completed, proving that there was no
fault.
By Mr Young - The question of erecting a fan for
the whole colliery had been discussed by the chairman of the
company and myself two months before the accident.
By Mr Atkinson - At the time of the accident
only one of the cages in No. 2 shaft happened to be connected with
the enginehouse.
Mr Guthrie - This closes my evidence, my
lord.
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE MINERS.
A BOTTOMER AND THE CUBE.
David Hunter, questioned by Mr Young, deponed -
I acted as bottomer in No. 2 shaft. I had also to attend the cube
of No. 3 pit. Connors, another bottomer, attended the cube also. I
have also seen the roadsman and the underground manager looking
after the cube. On the morning of the accident an open fire had
been lit near the cube. The fire was laid on six feet rails. There
was a considerable current of air. Cooper gave me special
directions on the morning of the accident to attend to the fires.
He asked me to carry water and empty it on the wood-work for fear
of the wood getting heated. Connors was not on duty that day; but
another young man, Murdoch, was asked to help me. Cooper showed me
where I was to empty the water. I put the water on the crossbars
and the sides. I complained to Cooper about it being too hot to put
the water on the spot that he suggested, and I also stated that I
thought the fires were too big. I said I was convinced the thing
would go up. I got sick of the job and got Cooper persuaded to send
Murdoch, my companion, to take up the work. On my return at 2
o'clock I noticed nothing wrong. The first alarm I heard was
when Cooper said that the pit was on fire. I went immediately to
the bottom of No. 3 shaft, and found the woodwork right above the
new fire place on fire. I do not think the sides were burning at
that time. I helped to throw water on the roof, but it did not seem
to do any good. I cried to some men that the pit was on fire, and
that they were to warn the others. When I got to the pithead I
found that the frame of No. 3 pit was on fire, and I saw it fall to
the side. The engine house had been burnt by this time. A lot of
burning stuff was coming up the shaft. Sometime afterwards Mr
Calderwood appeared and asked the help of six men to go below.
Calderwood said to my father "You're a good man. You'll need
to come down". My father did not seem inclined to go, and some
of the men said to him "You're never so sticking as
that", whereupon he said "In that case, I'll
go", and he went. Soon after Mr Calderwood and my father went
down, I saw smoke issuing from No. 2 shaft.
By Mr Guthrie - On the day of the accident the
water tank was quite full, and when I left it at 11 o'clock
there was still water in it. Down to that time there was always
someone near the cube charged with looking after it.
By Mr Atkinson - I saw nothing on the surface to
indicate that there had been a fall of material in the
shaft.
A FIREMAN'S VIEW.
Thomas Sharp, fireman, said that he was on the
night shift from December 1894 to the time of the accident. He had
to look after the fires from the time the inspector left at 11 at
night to 6.30 next morning. All he had to do was to attend to the
cube at No. 3 shaft. Shortly after he went to the colliery he had
twice to reduce the fire in the cube because he was afraid the
timber would catch fire. Two or three times he had said to the
underground manager that he thought that the fire was not in the
right place, and that there was danger of the timber catching fire.
On the morning of the accident Cooper told him that he wanted an
extra fire put on, as there had been black damp showing.
By Mr Guthrie - His brother and his nephew were
killed in the accident.
WHAT A CHECKWEIGHMAN SAW.
John Simpson, checkweighman, deponed that after
the fire broke out he saw people attempting to cover up the mouth
of No. 3 shaft, and he told the engineer that if it was persisted
in the men in No. 2 pit would be suffocated. The engineer said
"I cannot desist, it's the manager's orders". At
that time there was no appearance of flame, but a great amount of
smoke. He went to No. 2 pithead to attend to his duties, and he
said to the pitheadman that he should stop drawing coals and get
the men up. His suggestion was not followed. Coals continued to be
drawn up until 4 minutes to 3 o'clock, although not to the same
extents as previously. Before 3 o'clock the flames were leaping
right over the pulleys.
By Mr Atkinson - He did not see anything on the
surface which would have caused a rumbling noise in No. 3 shaft. It
was impossible to get close to the pit mouth in consequence of the
smoke and flame. His impression was that it was the cradling of the
pit near to the surface that had given way.
The inquiry was at this stage adjourned until
Wednesday.
WEDNESDAY'S
EVIDENCE.
The inquiry was resumed at ten o'clock on
Wednesday morning.
Mr Thomson asked Mr Young if he intended leading
evidence as to anything falling down the shaft. The evidence as it
stood was vague. All they had got was that something had fallen
down the shaft and that something reversed the current.
Mr Young said that Mr Calderwood had spoken to
the fall of a cage, and there was evidence as to the fall of timber
work.
Mr Thomson said that the shaft must have been
fully inspected since the accident, and at the close of the
evidence he should like to have Mr Calderwood in the box once
more.
HOW WATER WAS CARRIED.
Robert Murdoch, Store Row, Oakley deponed - I
started work at Kinneddar on the Monday before the accident. I got
no instructions from Cooper to attend to the furnace at No. 3. At
eleven o'clock Hunter told me to carry water to fill the kettle
at the furnace. I was told by Hunter to put water on the wood-work
occasionally. He felt the heat too strong for him, and asked me to
put the water on the wood. Cooper said nothing about me taking
Hunter's place. Before I began, Cooper took a pailful of water
and threw it on the woodwork to show me how to do it. I had to
throw the water over the top of the fire, and wet the woodwork at
the back with it. The woodwork was about three feet from the
furnace. I threw water on the wood at intervals until about 2.30.
There was not a man watching the furnace. It was not usual to have
a man there. About twenty minutes to three I heard an alarm of
fire. I was that time bottoming at No. 2. Hunter was with me, and
he went to No. 3, taking the pails with him. I went up for screen
cloth, and on taking it towards No. 3 shaft I saw the shine of the
fire.
By Mr Guthrie - I had nothing to do with the
furnace prior to the day of the accident. Connors was the man who
attended to it. I do not remember seeing Alexander Thomson on the
day of the accident. When I left off carrying water at 2.30 there
was no one in charge of the fire. I left because the kettle was
full of water. I told John Cooper that the kettle was full. He knew
I was leaving. Between 11 and 2.30 I was carrying water to the
kettle, and was therefore sometimes away from the furnace. I cannot
say whether Thomson was at the furnace during the intervals I was
away from it. No coal was put on the cube, furnace, or firelamp
between 11 and 2 o'clock. No one saw him do so.
By Mr Atkinson - I cannot say how many pailfuls
of water I brought between 11 and 2 o'clock. I think I would
bring a race every quarter-of-an-hour. I generally put one pailful
of water into the kettle and dashed another on to the woodwork.
There were big fires on. I felt the heat oppressive when dashing
water on the woodwork.
Why did you not throw all the pailfuls of water
on to the woodwork? - Because my orders were to fill the
kettle.
By Mr Guthrie - I brought two pailfuls of water
every journey.
Michael Connors, Comrie Village, questioned by
Mr Young deponed - I was one of the bottomers of No. 2 pit. David
Hunter was my fellow bottomer. I was engaged on the east side and
he was engaged on the west side. It was the duty of the bottomers
to open and shut the gates at the entrance to the mouth of the
shaft as the cage started for the surface. Only one of the gates
was connected with the dial in the engine house, so that the
engineman could tell whether the gate was shut or not. The bell was
on the west side, and that was the proper side for the men going on
to the cage. On coming along the east level loading from No. 3 pit
the men got to the west side of No. 2 by means of a passage running
between the south side of the pit and the wall. It was part of my
duty to attend to the furnace of No. 3 pit. I was not on duty on
the day of the accident. The kettle for water had stood near the
furnace from the start. The object of the kettle of water was to
provide water to put on the woodwork in case of danger. I certainly
found that the woodwork could be heated, and I threw water on the
woodwork when I thought the heating was taking place. When the trap
door in the east level between the bottoms of the two shafts was
opened, there was such a draught at No. 3 bottom that you could
scarcely keep your lamp in. This draught had a considerable effect
upon the furnace. We had strict orders to keep the doors shut.
Alexander Thomson saw that Hunter and I attended to the furnace. On
the day before the accident the fire was kept very big.
Why? - Because the air in the pit was very bad,
and we were told to keep the fire extra large to increase the air
current. Once or twice during the time I was employed at the bottom
of the pit I damped down the fire a bit because I was afraid the
woodwork would get too hot. Black damp had made its appearance in
the mine, although not in the quantity to stop the whole
work.
By Mr Guthrie - I had had charge of the fire for
months and no accidents happened.
By Mr Comrie Thomson - But are you of opinion
that the woodwork would have gone on fire if you had not used the
water liberally? - Yes.
By Mr Guthrie - You had always plenty of water?
- We had to carry it from No. 2 bottom. The kettle was not always
filled with water; but we could have plenty of water for the
carrying. Hunter attended to the fire when I was engaged at work
with Alex. Thomson.
By Mr Young - I threw the water on to the sides;
and at no time did I ever attempt to put water on the wooden bars
of the roof.
By Mr Atkinson - When the trap door on the level
was open I could feel the extra draught. I always took care to get
the door shut when I felt the extra draught.
A LATE INSPECTOR'S OPINION.
Alexander Condie, Gladstone Cottage, Comrie, in
answer to Mr Young deponed - I was engaged as an inspector at the
Kinneddar pits from September 1891 to February 1895, and had
therefore left Kinneddar before he accident. There was plenty of
air in the bottom of the down cast shaft; but in some parts of the
mine it was not well directed. I remember sometime after I went to
work at Kinneddar we had some little trouble with black damp. The
black damp came from the west level. I sent the men
home.
Mr Comrie Thomson - This will be entered in the
report book.
Witness - It may not be. The air had cleared I
remember by three o'clock; and I did not as a rule make any
entry in the book until after three o'clock.
Mr Atkinson - But the fact that black damp had
made its appearance ought to be entered in the book.
By Mr Young - A firelamp was in operation before the cube was built. I told Cooper, the underground manager, and Mr
Alex. Thomson that it was a mistake to build the cube so near the
shaft.
What dangers did you anticipate? - That the
whole thing would be set on fire. A great draught came from the
splint seam. In reply to me John Cooper said that he thought it a
mistake to put the cube so near; but he followed this up by saying
it was only to be temporary. I also said to Cooper that it would be
far better for hot air to strike the wood than perhaps the
flames.
Mr Comrie Thomson - And what did Cooper
say?
Witness - He swore.
Mr Comrie Thomson - Just leave out the swearing.
By Mr Young - I told Alex. Thomson that I would
not accept any responsibility for anything that might take place in
connection with the cube. I told him of a case I knew of where a
fire had occurred under similar circumstances. I have seen water
thrown on the woodwork. The sides were nearer to the flames than
any of the other wood work, and to me it was always apparent that
the furnace was dangerous. Cooper evidently thought the cube
dangerous, after it was in operation, for he asked me for God's
sake to look after it. I mentioned my fears more than once to
Cooper. I have put coal onto the cube, and have had to take coal
off when I found that the flames were going too close to the
sides.
By Mr Guthrie - I am not aware that any one in
particular had charge of attending to the furnace during the day
time. I have seen three or four different parties putting coal on
the cube - Hunter, Connors, Cooper, and Thomson. I have also put on
coals myself. Connors and Hunter were always at the bottom, and
gave the cube their attention, although I am not aware that they
had special charge of the cube. I had other duties to attend
to.
Did you see Connors and Hunter take more charge
of the cube than Cooper or Thomson? - I did not know who had charge
of it. I was not at the cube except at breakfast time, and at that
time Thomson and Cooper were also there. I cannot speak as to what
went on during the other hours of the day. For all I know the cube
may have been in charge of Hunter and Connors. I believe it would
be so because they were the bottomers. The only person who was
present whose name I recollect, when I spoke to Cooper about the
cube was Thomson, who is dead. I left the Fifeshire Main Collieries
in February 1895 for a better situation and got the favour of not
requiring to work a notice.
Do you seriously say you considered that the
cube was a source of danger? - I never thought anything
else.
Why did you remain in the pit until February
1895 if you thought it in such a dangerous condition? - I did not
consider the cube dangerous to life but only to
property.
With care and proper precaution was the cube not
safe enough? - I never considered it safe. I did not think any man
would be injured. During the time I was there no accident occurred
in connection with the cube.
By Mr Atkinson - The woodwork I though likely to
be set on fire by the cube was the slides. I did not anticipate
that the crowns and cleading in the roof would be set on fire. The
flame was directed right into the open shaft. There was a covering
consisting of three cast iron plates on the cube. The firelamp was
used all the time I was there. There was no covering on the
firelamp but I never anticipated any trouble from it.
LOCKHART BLELOCH'S SCRAMBLE FOR LIFE.
Lockhart Bleloch, miner, Fordell, deponed - I
was a miner in the pit at the time of the accident. About 2.15 p.m.
on the day of the accident I was at No. 3 pit bottom, when
Alexander Thomson asked me to give him a hand to put out the fire.
There was a great heat at the place coming from three fires. It
seemed to me that the fire was in the packing above the bars. There
were three spots where I saw the fire like three candles. There was
about a couple of feet between each of them. They were right above
the open fire. I formed no idea at the time as to what had caused
the fire. Thomson and I at once threw some water on the woodwork.
We could not make the water reach the place where the fire was, and
all we did seemed to do no good. In about fifteen minutes Cooper
came. We had by that time used most of the water in the kettle, and
Cooper ordered us to fetch more water. Two boys brought some more
water. Cooper left for a little and then came back with Calderwood.
By that time the fire had increased to be like a big roaring
furnace. The roof was all ablaze. Before Calderwood came Thomson
and I had attempted to knock out the supports in order to bring out
the bars. We only managed to knock out one of the uprights. We then
saw that our efforts to control the fire would be useless. I
proceeded to leave the mine and met Calderwood just at the trap
door between No. 2 and No. 3 pits. Thomas Sharp (who was killed)
was with me. Calderwood told us to go and stop up the cross cuts,
which is the only other passage in the Jersey seam leading to No. 3
pit. We went. I found a strong current of air coming from No. 2 in
the direction of No. 3 pit. It was so strong that we could not keep
our lamps in. We met Calderwood and we told him that we would need
more assistance, and he sent for Frank Sharp. Then we started to
put in the stopping. We had finished a portion of the stopping and
had a screen cloth ready to put on when the air current changed. At
that time smoke and dust came from No. 3 pit. We gave up the idea
of proceeding with the stopping, and made for the bottom. We went
along the level road to within three or four yards of the trap
door, and we noticed flames on the roof. We had to go on our hands
and knees and crawl along. When a little nearer the trap door Tom
Sharp called out that he was choking. We had no lights, and we
crawled along until we came to where our coats were, and then we
knew what direction to take. Up to then the two Sharps had been
crawling behind me. I don't know what became of them
afterwards. The first fresh air I got was at the bottom of No. 2
pit, which was the spot we had all been making for. I found Alex.
Thomson there belling down the cage. He said he was roasted. He
afterwards died. He and I were taken up. There were others went up,
but I don't remember whom. The Sharps did not come up, and I
explained where I thought they must go. Afterwards Calderwood,
Cooper, and others went down.
By Mr Guthrie - I was not burned at the time the
flame appeared, nor, so far as I know, were the Sharps. Up to the
time I got to my coat Thomas Sharp was quite close to me. After
that I don't know what happened to them. It was a good distance
before I came to my coat that he called out to me he was choking.
I cannot say whether Thomson shut the gate completely or not.
Neither he nor I had any light.
By Mr Atkinson - While we were working at the
stopping, Calderwood came to us. While he was with us there was a
slight reversal of the air current. On account of that we had to go
down to the foot of the east heading. Smoke followed us. The air
was very hot. We afterwards returned to the stopping. Calderwood
went with us. That was about twenty minutes or so before the great
rush of smoke and hot air came. Frank Sharp asked Calderwood if
there was any danger working there, and Calderwood replied -
"Yes, if the air reverses upon us". After the first smoke
and hot air came I felt a little timorous, but not exactly
afraid.
THE OPINION OF AN
EXPERT.
Thomas Paterson, mining engineer, Glasgow,
deponed - The fan has now, to a considerable extent superseded the
cube which is usually employed in the case of shallow pits. Now,
and in the case of new collieries, the ventilation fan is almost
invariably adopted. The primary cost of a fan is much greater than
that of a cube, but if the power of working the fan is got from the
existing boilers the future expenses may not be so great as that of
burning the quantity of coals a cube would require. The situation
of the cube in this case was much too near the shaft for safety.
There is a great danger in the use of a cube where there is
woodwork near. The presence of a supply of water satisfies me that
the use of the cube was considered to be attended with danger. The
kettle of water was insufficient provision to stop a fire once it
had broken out. If the furnace had been some yards away from the
shaft, it would have been just as good for ventilation purposes and
a great deal safer. The risk of fire was greatly increased by the
addition of an open fire, and I would not have allowed such a
thing. I never knew of such a dangerous expedient being resorted to
for ventilation. Being informed that the fire appeared in three
places in the roof, I am of the opinion that it must have been
ignited by the sparks or overheating or flame from the fire below.
The fine dust in the cleading would be very easily ignited and the
woodwork also. It was ridiculous to attempt to extinguish the fire
by throwing pailfuls of water on it. The metals were so soft and
brittle that the shaft required timbering to keep them in their
places, and of course when the timbering was consumed the metals
would come down. It would naturally follow that there would be a
reversal of the air current, and this would jeopardise the lives of
the men in the pit. When it was found that the fire had got a hold
of the woodwork, the first thing that should have been done was to
have withdrawn the men from the workings. The manager should then
have tried to stop the fire by shutting the mouth of the downcast
shaft and after that the burning shaft. That would have smothered
the fire. I think that even if the stopping which was attempted to
be erected near No. 3 pit had been completed it would not have
prevented the feeding of the air courses from No. 1 pit, the
stopping would have had no effect at all upon the fire.
By Mr Guthrie - I have never been down a pit
when it was burning. I have never had anything to do with putting
out a fire in a pit, nor examined a pit immediately after there had
been a fire in it.
You have had no experience whatsoever in
connection with fires in pits? - I was down the Barrwood Pit,
Kilsyth, six months after a fire following upon an explosion. It
was necessary to flood the pit before the fire was put out. The
method adopted in each case depends upon the circumstances. I have
seen cubes used as a permanent method of ventilation at a great
many different collieries. I am not aware of cubes being used
temporarily until the best situation for a fan is being
ascertained. It is generally known from the beginning where the fan
should be.
In the case of the Kinneddar pit the Jersey seam
is 53 fathoms, and the splint seam 61 fathoms - is that a shallow
pit? - Yes, comparatively shallow, and in a pit of these depths
cubes can be employed safely if properly constructed and properly
used.
If there was a timber roof above the cube would
it not have been more dangerous to have had the cube further away
from the shaft - if there were sparks was it not safer that they
should get up the shaft than lodge about the woodwork? - Oh,
yes.
Was it not safer then to have the cube near the
lip of the shaft? - It should have been further back and arched.
Any cubes that I have seen that were not arched had a hard
sandstone roof above them. These were permanent cubes. I do not
think that the cube at Kinneddar was safe even as a temporary
arrangement and even although it was watched. The supply of water
in the neighbourhood of the cube should have been under pressure.
The longer the cube was there the more ignitable would be the
timber near it become. The method of attempting to erect a stopping
was one that could not possibly have succeeded in putting out the
fire because the burning shaft would have been fed with fresh
air.
Assuming that measures were only taken while the
communication between No. 2 and No. 3 was being cut off to close up
the passages feeding No. 3, would that method not have succeeded? -
If all the air courses had been closed up simultaneously, the fire
would have been greatly diminished. It would have had the same
effect as closing the mouths of the shafts.
Supposing the manager had taken steps to close
up all the air courses, would you have lodged any objections? -
Yes, I objected to the men being down the pit while the shaft was
burning.
Is it your view that life should not be exposed
to risk in an attempt to save property? - No; but I think the risk
here was too great. There was a risk of the shaft collapsing at any
moment after the fire had got hold of it, the air currents
reversing, and the flames being thrown back upon the
men.
Have you had any experience of a fall in the
shaft causing a reversal of the current? - No; but from scientific
knowledge I say that if a shaft collapsed the air must be
reversed.
What reason was there to expect that the shaft
would collapse? - It would collapse when the timber got
burned.
Does the timber burn straight off? - Yes, where
it has been previously dried up with continued heat.
That's been your experience, has it? -
Common sense tells anyone that.
From your experience or common sense was this
shaft likely to burn long before it would collapse? - Ten
minutes.
Do you know that it took a great deal longer
than ten minutes in this case? - It may have done. That is a matter
on which people of skill will differ, and the manager was bound to
act on his own judgement.
What would be the quickest method of putting out
the fire? - The simultaneous closing of all the air currents would
have a quicker effect on the fire than closing the mouths of the
shafts. By adopting the latter method it would have been necessary
to close No. 1, No. 2, and then No. 3.
How long would it have taken to do that? - With
plenty of men and material it could have been done within an hour.
I do not think there would have been much difficulty in closing No.
2, notwithstanding the pumping and winding machinery. The time it
would take to close up the mouths of the mine would depend upon the
energetic manner the work was gone about. If three or four hours
elapsed before the mouths of the shafts were closed, the time would
be too long. When I spoke of closing the shafts within an hour, I
meant a temporary closing.
By Mr Young - If a furnace is to be used at all,
it ought to be well constructed and well situated. I never saw a
furnace in operation under circumstances such as were present at
Kinneddar - a wooden roof. It is usual to have the roof of the cube
constructed of fire-brick. I don't know of any covering of iron
plates. There would be a greater radiation of heat from an iron
covering than of fire-brick.
By Mr Atkinson - The risk in the first place was
to property, not to life. Had I been in the Kinneddar pit on the
day of the accident, I think that there would have been present in
my mind the risk, if the timbers were burned, of the material
behind falling and causing a reversal of air current. I don't
think that the miners would realise that risk. I have had no
personal experience of a reversal of the air current being brought
about by a fall of debris down the shaft. I have read of such
accidents occurring, however.
THE EXPLORATIONS IN THE WRECKED SHAFT.
Robert Calderwood recalled, said in answer to Mr
Guthrie, that the whole of the burnt pit had been explored since
the date of the fire. The only fall that appears to have taken
place in the shaft is a fall from a point about 20 fathoms above
the Jersey seam. An extensive fall also took place from the
surface. The explorations in the shaft have not thrown any
additional light on the point as to how the air current came to be
reversed. Some of the witnesses have spoken of the flames from the
coal. I wish to explain that very little flame comes from our coal
- it is almost like anthracite coal.
By Mr Young - Why is it there is no entry of
black damp in the report book for the day previous to the accident?
- The book is kept by the fireman.
THE CLOSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
This concludes the evidence, and Counsel agreed
to furnish the Commissioner and the Assessor with short written
statements bearing on the evidence adduced.
The Court then rose.
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