Oakley/Kinneddar Colliery

"THE DUNFERMLINE JOURNAL"
SATURDAY, JUNE 8, 1895
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A KINNEDDAR PIT ON FIRE.
TWO MEN KILLED AND EIGHT INJURED

Terrible Destruction of Colliery Plant.

The preparations which were being made by the miners of Fife, for the celebration next week of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the eight hours a day system of working in the mines, received yesterday a terrible check by an accident, which occurred at the Fifeshire Main Company's pits at Kinneddar, through which two men were killed, eight men injured, and a great loss sustained through the destruction of colliery plant. The Fifeshire Mains Company's works are situated at the foot of the Saline Hills, about four miles from the burgh of Dunfermline, and the colliery consists of two pits - an upcast and a downcast shaft - which are separated from each other by not more than thirty yards. Both shafts are sunk to the Lochgelly splint seam, a depth of about sixty fathoms, and because of the brittle nature of the metals passed through the pits are lined from top almost to the bottom with strong wooden beams. The air in the mines is quickened by a rarefying furnace which is built in the Jersey seam about eleven fathoms up the upcast shaft. The pits are worked on the double shift system - one shift commencing operations at seven o'clock in the morning, while the men engaged in the second shift are lowered at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. One hundred and eighteen men were lowered at seven o'clock, yesterday and all seems to have gone well during the day until a few minutes before three o'clock when the fore shift men began to ascend and the back shift men began to assemble on the pithead. At this hour

An Unusual Volume of Smoke

was observed coming up the upcast shaft, and the men on the pithead at once came to the conclusion that something was wrong. Before they had thought long over probable theories as to the dense smoke, Mr John Coupar, the underground manager, arrived on the pithead, and announced that the woodwork of the upcast shaft had caught fire in the vicinity of the furnace. Mr Calderwood, the general manager, who had just arrived at the scene, at once grasped the situation, and with his undermanager leapt on to the cage and descended the downcast shaft. Mr Calderwood and Mr Coupar were in the seat of the fire in little more than a couple of minutes, and they found that a number of men, including Alexander Thomson, the night inspector, were bravely trying to cope with the burning by pouring water on the flames. The flames were by this time roaring furiously a considerable distance up the shaft, and Mr Calderwood at once came to the conclusion that the water which could be carried in vessels by even an increased squad of men could have no effect on the burning. He accordingly drafted the men to different points in the air courses and started them on the work of stopping in the hope of being able to cut off the air from the rarefying shaft. Meantime, care was taken to dispatch messengers for the men engaged at the coal face, and within a few minutes all the men, with the exception of those actively engaged in the extinguishing work, had been got to the surface. After making a journey through the lower workings to see that the stopping work was being carried on effectively, Mr Calderwood entered the cage of the downcast shaft with a view of being raised to the higher bottom. Through some little mistake or another he was raised to the surface. The cage was lowered without delay, and a squad of men came to the pit bank to announce that they had been completely beaten off by the flames, the repeated falls of debris down the upcast shaft having completely changed the air current. With such fury had the flames turned upon the men that some of them were badly burned about the face and hands. The cage was again lowered with all possible speed, and in a few seconds a second batch of the extinguishers had arrived on the pithead to tell the same story. Some of the second batch of men also bore marks of the terrible position in which they had been placed. An enquiry on the part of the general manager brought out the fact that two men, namely, Frank Sharp (61), a miner residing at Comrie Village, and a relative named Thomas Sharp (25), also residing in Comrie Village, were amissing. When this discovery was made, the smoke was issuing from all parts of the pit, and the cages even in the downcast shaft stood in a dense volume of smoke. A slight clearance was effected by rushing a large volume of water from the pumps down the mine, and Mr Calderwood got on the cage, calling for volunteers who were prepared to descend the shaft. He very soon had John Coupar, the underground manager, and John Hynd, the night fireman, by his side, and the three men descended to the Jersey or upper seam where it was known the men had been employed at the blocking up work. No trace of the missing men could be found, and a second descent of the same explorers was as futile as the first. Further assurances having been given that the Sharps had been seen in the mine at a late stage of the work, a third descent was made - but this time the explorers went to the lowest seam. On reaching the bottom they were horrified to find the two men lying on the plates - the unfortunate men having

In Scrambling About In The Dark

fallen from the Jersey seam to the Lochgelly splint down the shaft, a distance of eleven fathoms. On the two men being brought to the surface it was found that life was extinct - the injuries sustained by the fall having been of such a nature as to cause instantaneous death. The bodies having been dispatched to the respective homes of the poor men, attention was directed towards the injured who, meantime, had been accommodated in the colliery office. It was found that the following were all suffering from burns of a more or less serious nature: - Alexander Thomson, Blackhouse, Oakley; William McKenna, Torryburn; Lockhart Bleloch, Comrie Village; John Hunter, Comrie; George Ramage. Oakley; Thomas Hunter, Comrie; George Bell, Oakley; and Alexander Short, Oakley. Telephone messages were dispatched to Dunfermline, and in a remarkable brief space of time the most of the injured men had been removed to Dunfermline Cottage Hospital. The dead and injured removed, Mr Calderwood and a large squad of men were able to turn their attention on the work of attempting to extinguish the burning. Short as the space of time had been from the time the smoke was noticed, the burning had made terrible progress in the upcast shaft, and the flames were issuing from the mouth of the shaft - fifty feet from the actual seat of the fire. The pithead frame soon caught fire, and shortly after the flames had begun to rise the height of sixty feet above the pit mouth, the huge wooden frame fell a total wreck, some of the burning planks going reeling down the shaft. The pithead fittings also caught fire and communicated the burning to the winding engine house. The wire rope became all tangled and twisted, and before many minutes had passed the winding drum stood a naked frame. The winding coupling engines, which were of the most approved type, were much damaged by the fire. Seeing that it was hopeless to attempt to extinguish the burning by ordinary methods, Mr Calderwood and his staff of men closed the mouth of the now ruined upcast shaft, stopped the pumping engine in the downcast shaft, and dampened down the downcast shaft. At the hour of writing the heat was intense at the mouth of the upcast shaft, and at repeated intervals huge rumblings took place, which indicated the work of destruction in the upcast was complete. Everything pointed to the conclusion that the metals had caught fire in the vicinity of the upcast shaft. The flow of water is from three hundred to four hundred gallons per minute, but the workings in the two seams extend to such a distance that a considerable time must elapse before the water can reach the seat of the fire. Hopes are entertained, however, that the damping down expedients resorted to will retard the burning to such an extent that the water will have risen before greater damage has been done to the general workings. Meantime upwards of two hundred men are thrown idle.

Interviews.

In an interview with one of our representatives, Mr Calderwood said that he grasped the situation as soon as he came forward and noticed the dense volume of smoke issuing from the upcast shaft. The destruction of the woodwork in the shaft and the gearing of the pit was the work of a few minutes. The men made rapid progress with the stopping he had started them upon, and if they had only got a little more time, there can have been little doubt but the extinguishing work would have soon reduced the fury of the burning.

One of the men engaged at the work of stopping says: - "After we had proceeded a short time with our work, a tremendous fall of rubbish came down the upcast shaft and drove the flames out upon us. Our lamps were blown out and the air current became changed. Feeling we were in great danger of losing our lives, all the squad at once began to scramble in the dark to the bottom of the upcast shaft. We found our way by running our hands along the signal wire of the roadway. It was with great difficulty some of us managed to scramble to the bottom. The pain from the burns was intense."

An eye-witness says: - "I have never seen a fire burn with such fury. Within ten minutes of the discovery of the burning, the upcast shaft had become a burning funnel, and in little more than an hour, the shaft and gearing had become a total wreck. Because of the enormous height of the pithead frame, it was dangerous to go within 50 yards of the upcast shaft."

Another eye-witness says: - "I could compare the burning in the shaft to nothing but a huge blast furnace, and I have seen nothing approaching the scene after the pithead frame and the engine house had taken fire."

Large crowds of people visited the scene of the fire in the course of the evening - Mr Weir, the miners secretary, putting in an early appearance. In the villages where the men engaged in the pits were resident, great excitement prevails.


LATEST DETAILS.
TWO DEATHS IN THE HOSPITAL
OTHER MEN CRITICAL.

        Saturday, 1 a.m.

A visit to Dunfermline Cottage Hospital at one o' clock this morning showed that the catastrophe was much more serious than was first anticipated. All the injured, with the exception of Lockhart Bleloch, were removed to the hospital, and at a glance the doctors who had been summoned - nearly all the Dunfermline medical men were soon in the building - saw that at least six of the seven men brought in were in anything but a comfortable state. John Hunter (30) and Alex Thomson (35) were indeed found to be in an extremely critical state, and before 12 o'clock had been struck both men had succumbed to their injuries. So badly were their faces charred that the poor men were beyond recognition before the end came.

Late - At 1.30 o'clock another of the men was reported to be sinking fast, and two of his comrades showed symptoms which could not fail to give the gravest cause for alarm. Nearly all the medical men have been on duty the whole night, and the hospital staff have not had a single moments rest.


ANOTHER TWO DEATHS.

       Later - Saturday, 2 a.m.

On inquiry at the hospital at 2 a.m., we were informed that another two of the men, George Ramage and Thomas Hunter, had died - making six deaths in all. The condition of the other three men in the hospital had become much more critical - convulsions having supervened.

THE CONDITION OF THE OTHER THREE MEN.

      Latest - 2.30

In the course of a conversation at this hour, Dr Dow stated that he found that some of the men must have inhaled heated particles of dust, which had the effect of accelerating death. Several of the men had vomited black matter. The immediate cause of death, however, had been exhaustion and the extensive surface covered by the burns - heads, faces, and bodies being terribly scorched. The three men who are still alive are in an extremely critical state. One of them, at least, cannot survive many hours.

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THE DUNFERMLINE JOURNAL
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1895.
THE KINNEDDAR COLLIERY DISASTER.
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THE PUBLIC INQUIRY.

The public inquiry was resumed in the Dunfermline Sheriff Courthouse on Tuesday into the cause of the burning accident, by which nine men lost their lives at the Fifeshire Main Coal Company's works at Kinneddar on 31st May last. Seven of the men, it will be remembered, were fatally burned while employed cutting off the air current from the burning upcast shaft, while the other two men were killed by falling from one seam to another in attempting to make their escape up the downcast shaft. The Commissioner was Mr J. Comrie Thomson, advocate, Edinburgh, and the Assessor Mr J. B. Atkinson, H. M. Inspector of Mines. The Mine owners were represented by Mr C. J. Guthrie, advocate, instructed by Mr A. Guthrie, S. S. C; and Mr A. J. Young, advocate, instructed by Mr Jas. Currie Macbeth, solicitor, Dunfermline, Fife and Kinross Miners' Association. Mr McFarlane was present representing the Crown. Mr Weir was also present along with Mr Robert Smillie, President of the Scottish Miners' Federation; Mr William Parrot, Yorkshire, and Mr George Hancock, Nottingham, members of the British Federation Executive.

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TUESDAY'S EVIDENCE.
A COLLIERY MANAGER'S EVIDENCE.

James Ritchie, manager, Gartness Colliery, Airdrie who was the first witness examined, deponed in answer to Mr Guthrie: - I have been manager of Gartness Colliery for eight years, and have been connected with mining for 25 year. I have been shown a plan and model of the Fifeshire Main Colliery, and my attention has been directed specially to the fact that there had been a furnace at No. 3 shaft. Cubes when properly looked after constitute a fairly safe arrangement. After the pits are fully developed a fan is generally adopted instead of a cube. Cubes are put down sometimes as a temporary arrangement until the workings are fully developed. There is always danger connected with the use of cubes; but when the cubes are properly looked after there is not so much danger. The safety or danger of a cube such as was in operation at Kinneddar would depend on how the cube was used. In what I have said I have kept in view the fact that the fire bars and a fire lamp were in use in addition to the cube. Mr Calderwood's plan of putting a stopping into the workings, after the fire broke out, was a wise one. If there were plenty of men and plenty of material the stopping should have been erected within three quarters of an hour. Other methods of extinguishing the fire might have been adopted - closing the mouths of the shafts after the men had been brought to the surface. I know nothing that could have enabled Mr Calderwood to have foreseen what took place. I should have expected that the stopping would have been completed before any substantial fall of debris would have taken place in the burning shaft. A ventilation registering 20,000 cubic feet per minute seems to me to be fairly good for the number of men employed in the pits.

By Mr Young - The cause of the accident was the reversion of the air current, and the cause of that must have been the giving way of the lining of the shaft. The lining fell on account of the fire. The fire must have been caused by either flames or sparks from the cube.

Would it not have been safer to have had the cube further back from the shaft? I have known cases of fire where the cube was 20 or 40 yards away from the shaft. Possibly it might have been safer if the cube had been further away but I cannot say positively. I do not remember ever finding a cube, an open fire place, and a fire lamp all used together for ventilating purposes.

Don't you think that the risk from fire would be greatly increased by the use of the open fire-place and the fire-lamp? - The larger the fireplace the greater the draught, and the greater would have been the tendency to set fire to the shaft. I would have had an open fire-place if I had thought it necessary to increase the ventilation, but not if I had considered it dangerous. It was an element of consideration that the shaft was timbered throughout and that the roof of the bottom was also timbered. The presence of the fire would dry the timber and make it more inflammable.

If you had been in Mr Calderwood's place would you have adopted the plan of putting in a stopping? - I think I would have done that. On the spur of the moment it was a rather prudent thing to do.

Supposing you had known that the shaft was in flames from top to bottom would you have ordered the men to put in a stopping? If I had thought I had time to erect a stopping I would have done it.

Which end would it serve to put in a stopping? - It would stop the current of air and extinguish the fire.

Had the fire in the shaft not done as much harm as it could have done? - No. I have known a shaft on fire and the flames coming out of the mouth of the shaft. When the fire was extinguished it was found that the timber remained sufficient for its purpose, as only the skin of the timber had been burned. The fire might have been extinguished by stopping the mouths of the shafts; but before this plan was attempted the men would require to be all out of the mine. Had I been on the ground I would have adopted the plan of stopping adopted by Mr Calderwood.

Would you have adopted that course even although you had known that the upcast shaft was on fire? - If I had thought that there was time to put in a stopping.

If you had known that the shaft was wholly on fire would you have put in a stopping such as Mr Calderwood did? - Well, the shaft being on fire I certainly would have taken the precaution of putting in a stopping and trying to cut off the air current.

Re-examined by Mr Guthrie - To station a man at the furnace and furnish him with a supply of water were just the precautions which would have been taken to prevent fire. It is not possible to judge accurately of the strength and position of the fan until the workings had been developed to a considerable extent. It is quite a usual thing to adopt a temporary expedient until the workings are developed. The fact that the flames were in the shaft did not necessarily indicate that the shaft was on fire from top to bottom.

By Mr Atkinson - I have had experience of a few cases of fire.

In the case of the Kinneddar an open fire was built on the day of the accident, and within a few hours after the open fire was lit the woodwork of the shaft was on flames - do you consider that the building of this open fire indicated a lack of judgement? - Well, it would depend upon the surroundings and the precautions taken. It might have been a lack of cautiousness at the fire.

Mr Comrie Thomson - The fire was attributable to some cause. I suppose it come to this that the fire got too strong or was too near the timber.

By Mr Atkinson - Do you think that there was a lack of caution in looking after the fire or in building the open fire? - There may have been a want of caution in looking after the fire.

A MINING ENGINEER'S EVIDENCE.

John Watson Ormiston, mining engineer, Glasgow, questioned by Mr Guthrie, deponed that for two years he had been consulting engineer to the Fifeshire Main Colliery. He had examined the plan and model. He had no fault to find with a cube as a temporary arrangement. In the present case the cube was used for a temporary purpose, because it had not yet been settled where the permanent fan was to be placed. The workings were not fully developed to make it possible to say what size of fan should be used or where it should be placed. He found no reason to find fault with the size of the cube or its position. If black damp were found in the pit the day before the accident there was no objections to adding to the heat by means of an additional fire upon the bars, provided a screen of bricks and a covering had been erected to deflect the heat or flames into the shaft. It was natural to expect, if there was no covering, that the heat and flames would ascend and attack the wooden roof above. The plan of erecting a stopper where the manager put it, so as to shut off the air from the fire was the method that witness himself would have adopted. If there was no material suitable for closing over the pit mouth, the quickest course was that adopted. He would not have anticipated a reversal of the air current. He would not have expected such a considerable fall of debris as would have reversed the current. He was taking into account the nature of the strata, and the fact that the timber was fresh. From the statement of the circumstances made to him by Mr Calderwood, witness thought he would have acted just as Mr Calderwood had done.

By Mr Young - The pit was in ordinary working order. He was consulted by the manager about various matters connected with the pit, and long prior to the accident it was explained to him that it was intended to erect a ventilating fan. That was his impression; he was not positive about it. He was not consulted as to the erection of a fan. The position of the fan would be at the end of the upcast shaft, but he understood it had not been settled which was to be the permanent upcast shaft. It had been suggested that there should be another shaft which would have been the permanent upcast shaft. He considered in the circumstances, especially in view of the wood above, that a brick screen and covering at the open fire would have been a necessary and ordinary precaution. He would not have allowed a fire without a covering, when there was wood above, but his experience made him more careful in this respect than many. The two pit bottomers at No. 2 pit were not sufficient to look after the fire. Men ought to be told off to do nothing but watch it.

By Mr Guthrie - A pit bottomer would have been a quite suitable person to watch the fire if he did nothing else to do.

Supposing the fireman was told specially to look after the fire, would that have been the kind of precaution you would have expected? - Yes.

By Mr Atkinson - The fan was preferred because with it they got a very speedy current of air, and there was no risk of fire.

CUBES OR FANS.

Alexander Simpson, mining engineer, Glasgow, deponed - In former years the cube was used as a means of ventilation. In such districts as Fifeshire, where there is little or no gas in the workings, it is usual to employ cubes until it is settled where the fan should be situated; but in Lanarkshire, where there is a good deal of gas, we do not like to use cubes at all. Assuming that the cube was properly attended to, I should not have anticipated any danger at Kinneddar. The usual mode of getting quit of black damp was to increase the ventilation; and if black damp had been discovered at Kinneddar the day before the accident, it was right to try to increase the current of air by increasing the heat. If the fire put down on iron bars near the cube was not a particularly large one, I should not have anticipated any danger, looking at the space and the ignitable matter. If the fireman had been told to keep a watch and a plentiful supply of water was kept close by, I should not have thought that there was any probability of danger. The fire lamp was a very small thing, and could not have increased the danger of combustion to any extent. I am of opinion that Mr Calderwood acted wisely in proceeding to put in the stopping he did in the hope of cutting off the air current. It would have been exceedingly dangerous, indeed madness, to have proceeded to stop up the mouths of the shafts while the men were in the pit.

By Mr Young - My information about the facts of the case is mainly derived from the report of the last day's proceedings in a Dunfermline paper. I had a talk with Mr Calderwood this morning. The fire must have been caused by sparks or something from the cube or the open fire. A man watching the fire could so regulate it as to prevent sparks rising. The reason why the fan is preferred to the cube is because with the former there is no danger of fire, and it produces a much more satisfactory ventilation. In the long run, in a pit which requires a good deal of ventilation, the fan is the cheaper expedient. It is not usual to erect a fan which involves considerable outlay until the conditions of the workings are understood, but a fan is generally erected at the first where a good deal of gas is evolved in the colliery. The expense of the fan is incurred rather than run the risk arising from gases. If it be the case as I am informed, that the nearest woodwork was 13 feet from the cube, and there being so much space around, I should not expect mischief to have followed. Apart from what occurred in the present instance, I should not have found fault with the arrangements, but I now, after what has happened, say that they might have been better. I do not consider from November 1894 to May 1895 an extraordinary long time in which to use the cube before fixing the position of a fan, particularly if it be the case as I am informed, that the owner had some anticipation of a fault being come upon between No. 1 and No. 3 pits. I cannot recall any instance of having seen fire-lamp, and open furnace, and a cube used together, but it seems to me a natural thing that the ventilation should be increased by such expedients when black damp is found in the pits. Even if the timbering of the shaft had been got hold of by the fire it was a wise thing to put a stopper where it was erected. It would not have occurred to me that it was probable that the debris in the shaft would fall or that something would occur to reverse the current. I think the decision of the stopping was quite consistent with the probable safety of the men. It was quite right to withdraw the men from the pits, but it seems to me it was a practical thing to get the men to erect the stopping so as to save the property. If an attempt had been made to close the mouth of No. 3 shaft it is quite possible that part of the surface would have given way and the men falling down and been killed. There was danger either way, but I should have done what the manager did.

A MINER'S NARROW ESCAPE.

John Hind, fireman, stated that he had been employed at the Fifeshire Main Colliery for about two years and was there at the time of the accident. He went on duty at 3 p.m. and left off work at 11 p.m. It was part of his duty to attend to the cube, which was kept going night and day. He never heard any complaints about the ventilation or the furnace. He never saw any sign of fire about the wood near the furnace. When he went to the pit at 3 p.m. on the day of the accident to start work he noticed extra smoke coming out of No. 3 shaft. Cooper told him to put some planks across the mouth of the shaft. Witness put one or two planks across, but the smoke was coming up in such dense volumes that they had to desist. Witness afterwards went down No. 2 pit with George Bell, who was killed. Witness was at the place where the stopping was being erected and was sent to another part of the pit for shovels. After he had gone some distance he heard a noise as of something falling in No. 3 shaft. He returned, and on his way back towards the stopping he was met by some smoke. He saw no flame. By the time he reached the pit bottom the injured men had been taken up. When he first went down the shaft he did not think there was any danger. He never thought that anything would fall down the shaft and reverse the air current. The other men did not seem to have any anticipation of danger either.

By Mr Young - Cooper, the underground manager asked him to put the planks across the mouth of No. 3 shaft a few minutes after the fire broke out. The men had not been withdrawn from the pit at that time.

By Mr Atkinson - When he went along with George Bell towards No. 3 shaft he saw some small pieces of burning timber falling from the roof.

ANOTHER ESCAPE - PRESSURE ON THE CARS.

John Duff, miner, in answer to Mr Guthrie deponed - I have been employed at mining for 20 years. I was on the backshift at Kinneddar Colliery and arrived at the pithead on the day of the accident at 2.30 p.m. At that time there was more smoke than usual coming up the upcast shaft; but not enough to attract particular attention. About twenty minutes after that, however, the smoke became heavy, and a boy arrived on the pithead and stated that he had been sent for canvas to use as a screen for keeping back smoke. Immediately after this Mr Calderwood and Mr Cooper arrived on the pithead from the bottom of No. 2 pit, and ordered the men to fetch wood because they intended to put in a stopping. The wood was put on to the cage and Mr Calderwood, and Mr Cooper, and another two men and I descended the shaft to put in the stopping. We had not got far on with the work when it was found that we would need clay. George Ramage, Bell, and I, were dispatched for clay to another part of the workings. Ramage and Bell were both fatally injured. While I was engaged at the clay a boy cried to run. I got to the surface all right.

By Mr Young - When a boy came up the pit and at first announced that the upcast shaft was on fire, I called to the pitheadman to get the men up first and foremost. That was before I went down with Mr Calderwood. Just as Mr Calderwood gave the order for us to go and get clay I heard a roar in the upcast shaft as if the flames were making headway.

By Mr Atkinson - Before the boy called to run, while clay was being put into the hutches I noticed that a change had taken place in the air current. The air seemed to be going in both ways, and it made such a pressure on the ears as to make me think that my head was going to burst. I thought that something was wrong; but I did not stop work until the boy called to me.

THE GENERAL MANAGER RECALLED.

Robert Calderwood, general manager, who was examined at great length at a previous sitting of the court was recalled and answered a number of questions on the closing of the mouths of the shafts after the men had been all got to the surface. The splint seam had only been working a few months previous to the accident. The fan on No. 1 pit was not sufficient for the whole colliery, and we had to decide where a fan which would ventilate the whole colliery should be placed. The erection of a fan was in contemplation. There had been a suggestion to the effect that there was a fault between No. 1 and the other pits; and it was only in April that a roadway was completed, proving that there was no fault.

By Mr Young - The question of erecting a fan for the whole colliery had been discussed by the chairman of the company and myself two months before the accident.

By Mr Atkinson - At the time of the accident only one of the cages in No. 2 shaft happened to be connected with the enginehouse.

Mr Guthrie - This closes my evidence, my lord.

THE EVIDENCE FOR THE MINERS.
A BOTTOMER AND THE CUBE.

David Hunter, questioned by Mr Young, deponed - I acted as bottomer in No. 2 shaft. I had also to attend the cube of No. 3 pit. Connors, another bottomer, attended the cube also. I have also seen the roadsman and the underground manager looking after the cube. On the morning of the accident an open fire had been lit near the cube. The fire was laid on six feet rails. There was a considerable current of air. Cooper gave me special directions on the morning of the accident to attend to the fires. He asked me to carry water and empty it on the wood-work for fear of the wood getting heated. Connors was not on duty that day; but another young man, Murdoch, was asked to help me. Cooper showed me where I was to empty the water. I put the water on the crossbars and the sides. I complained to Cooper about it being too hot to put the water on the spot that he suggested, and I also stated that I thought the fires were too big. I said I was convinced the thing would go up. I got sick of the job and got Cooper persuaded to send Murdoch, my companion, to take up the work. On my return at 2 o'clock I noticed nothing wrong. The first alarm I heard was when Cooper said that the pit was on fire. I went immediately to the bottom of No. 3 shaft, and found the woodwork right above the new fire place on fire. I do not think the sides were burning at that time. I helped to throw water on the roof, but it did not seem to do any good. I cried to some men that the pit was on fire, and that they were to warn the others. When I got to the pithead I found that the frame of No. 3 pit was on fire, and I saw it fall to the side. The engine house had been burnt by this time. A lot of burning stuff was coming up the shaft. Sometime afterwards Mr Calderwood appeared and asked the help of six men to go below. Calderwood said to my father "You're a good man. You'll need to come down". My father did not seem inclined to go, and some of the men said to him "You're never so sticking as that", whereupon he said "In that case, I'll go", and he went. Soon after Mr Calderwood and my father went down, I saw smoke issuing from No. 2 shaft.

By Mr Guthrie - On the day of the accident the water tank was quite full, and when I left it at 11 o'clock there was still water in it. Down to that time there was always someone near the cube charged with looking after it.

By Mr Atkinson - I saw nothing on the surface to indicate that there had been a fall of material in the shaft.

A FIREMAN'S VIEW.

Thomas Sharp, fireman, said that he was on the night shift from December 1894 to the time of the accident. He had to look after the fires from the time the inspector left at 11 at night to 6.30 next morning. All he had to do was to attend to the cube at No. 3 shaft. Shortly after he went to the colliery he had twice to reduce the fire in the cube because he was afraid the timber would catch fire. Two or three times he had said to the underground manager that he thought that the fire was not in the right place, and that there was danger of the timber catching fire. On the morning of the accident Cooper told him that he wanted an extra fire put on, as there had been black damp showing.

By Mr Guthrie - His brother and his nephew were killed in the accident.

WHAT A CHECKWEIGHMAN SAW.

John Simpson, checkweighman, deponed that after the fire broke out he saw people attempting to cover up the mouth of No. 3 shaft, and he told the engineer that if it was persisted in the men in No. 2 pit would be suffocated. The engineer said "I cannot desist, it's the manager's orders". At that time there was no appearance of flame, but a great amount of smoke. He went to No. 2 pithead to attend to his duties, and he said to the pitheadman that he should stop drawing coals and get the men up. His suggestion was not followed. Coals continued to be drawn up until 4 minutes to 3 o'clock, although not to the same extents as previously. Before 3 o'clock the flames were leaping right over the pulleys.

By Mr Atkinson - He did not see anything on the surface which would have caused a rumbling noise in No. 3 shaft. It was impossible to get close to the pit mouth in consequence of the smoke and flame. His impression was that it was the cradling of the pit near to the surface that had given way.

The inquiry was at this stage adjourned until Wednesday.


WEDNESDAY'S EVIDENCE.

The inquiry was resumed at ten o'clock on Wednesday morning.

Mr Thomson asked Mr Young if he intended leading evidence as to anything falling down the shaft. The evidence as it stood was vague. All they had got was that something had fallen down the shaft and that something reversed the current.

Mr Young said that Mr Calderwood had spoken to the fall of a cage, and there was evidence as to the fall of timber work.

Mr Thomson said that the shaft must have been fully inspected since the accident, and at the close of the evidence he should like to have Mr Calderwood in the box once more.

HOW WATER WAS CARRIED.

Robert Murdoch, Store Row, Oakley deponed - I started work at Kinneddar on the Monday before the accident. I got no instructions from Cooper to attend to the furnace at No. 3. At eleven o'clock Hunter told me to carry water to fill the kettle at the furnace. I was told by Hunter to put water on the wood-work occasionally. He felt the heat too strong for him, and asked me to put the water on the wood. Cooper said nothing about me taking Hunter's place. Before I began, Cooper took a pailful of water and threw it on the woodwork to show me how to do it. I had to throw the water over the top of the fire, and wet the woodwork at the back with it. The woodwork was about three feet from the furnace. I threw water on the wood at intervals until about 2.30. There was not a man watching the furnace. It was not usual to have a man there. About twenty minutes to three I heard an alarm of fire. I was that time bottoming at No. 2. Hunter was with me, and he went to No. 3, taking the pails with him. I went up for screen cloth, and on taking it towards No. 3 shaft I saw the shine of the fire.

By Mr Guthrie - I had nothing to do with the furnace prior to the day of the accident. Connors was the man who attended to it. I do not remember seeing Alexander Thomson on the day of the accident. When I left off carrying water at 2.30 there was no one in charge of the fire. I left because the kettle was full of water. I told John Cooper that the kettle was full. He knew I was leaving. Between 11 and 2.30 I was carrying water to the kettle, and was therefore sometimes away from the furnace. I cannot say whether Thomson was at the furnace during the intervals I was away from it. No coal was put on the cube, furnace, or firelamp between 11 and 2 o'clock. No one saw him do so.

By Mr Atkinson - I cannot say how many pailfuls of water I brought between 11 and 2 o'clock. I think I would bring a race every quarter-of-an-hour. I generally put one pailful of water into the kettle and dashed another on to the woodwork. There were big fires on. I felt the heat oppressive when dashing water on the woodwork.

Why did you not throw all the pailfuls of water on to the woodwork? - Because my orders were to fill the kettle.

By Mr Guthrie - I brought two pailfuls of water every journey.

Michael Connors, Comrie Village, questioned by Mr Young deponed - I was one of the bottomers of No. 2 pit. David Hunter was my fellow bottomer. I was engaged on the east side and he was engaged on the west side. It was the duty of the bottomers to open and shut the gates at the entrance to the mouth of the shaft as the cage started for the surface. Only one of the gates was connected with the dial in the engine house, so that the engineman could tell whether the gate was shut or not. The bell was on the west side, and that was the proper side for the men going on to the cage. On coming along the east level loading from No. 3 pit the men got to the west side of No. 2 by means of a passage running between the south side of the pit and the wall. It was part of my duty to attend to the furnace of No. 3 pit. I was not on duty on the day of the accident. The kettle for water had stood near the furnace from the start. The object of the kettle of water was to provide water to put on the woodwork in case of danger. I certainly found that the woodwork could be heated, and I threw water on the woodwork when I thought the heating was taking place. When the trap door in the east level between the bottoms of the two shafts was opened, there was such a draught at No. 3 bottom that you could scarcely keep your lamp in. This draught had a considerable effect upon the furnace. We had strict orders to keep the doors shut. Alexander Thomson saw that Hunter and I attended to the furnace. On the day before the accident the fire was kept very big.

Why? - Because the air in the pit was very bad, and we were told to keep the fire extra large to increase the air current. Once or twice during the time I was employed at the bottom of the pit I damped down the fire a bit because I was afraid the woodwork would get too hot. Black damp had made its appearance in the mine, although not in the quantity to stop the whole work.

By Mr Guthrie - I had had charge of the fire for months and no accidents happened.

By Mr Comrie Thomson - But are you of opinion that the woodwork would have gone on fire if you had not used the water liberally? - Yes.

By Mr Guthrie - You had always plenty of water? - We had to carry it from No. 2 bottom. The kettle was not always filled with water; but we could have plenty of water for the carrying. Hunter attended to the fire when I was engaged at work with Alex. Thomson.

By Mr Young - I threw the water on to the sides; and at no time did I ever attempt to put water on the wooden bars of the roof.

By Mr Atkinson - When the trap door on the level was open I could feel the extra draught. I always took care to get the door shut when I felt the extra draught.

A LATE INSPECTOR'S OPINION.

Alexander Condie, Gladstone Cottage, Comrie, in answer to Mr Young deponed - I was engaged as an inspector at the Kinneddar pits from September 1891 to February 1895, and had therefore left Kinneddar before he accident. There was plenty of air in the bottom of the down cast shaft; but in some parts of the mine it was not well directed. I remember sometime after I went to work at Kinneddar we had some little trouble with black damp. The black damp came from the west level. I sent the men home.

Mr Comrie Thomson - This will be entered in the report book.

Witness - It may not be. The air had cleared I remember by three o'clock; and I did not as a rule make any entry in the book until after three o'clock.

Mr Atkinson - But the fact that black damp had made its appearance ought to be entered in the book.

By Mr Young - A firelamp was in operation before the cube was built. I told Cooper, the underground manager, and Mr Alex. Thomson that it was a mistake to build the cube so near the shaft.

What dangers did you anticipate? - That the whole thing would be set on fire. A great draught came from the splint seam. In reply to me John Cooper said that he thought it a mistake to put the cube so near; but he followed this up by saying it was only to be temporary. I also said to Cooper that it would be far better for hot air to strike the wood than perhaps the flames.

Mr Comrie Thomson - And what did Cooper say?

Witness - He swore.

Mr Comrie Thomson - Just leave out the swearing.

By Mr Young - I told Alex. Thomson that I would not accept any responsibility for anything that might take place in connection with the cube. I told him of a case I knew of where a fire had occurred under similar circumstances. I have seen water thrown on the woodwork. The sides were nearer to the flames than any of the other wood work, and to me it was always apparent that the furnace was dangerous. Cooper evidently thought the cube dangerous, after it was in operation, for he asked me for God's sake to look after it. I mentioned my fears more than once to Cooper. I have put coal onto the cube, and have had to take coal off when I found that the flames were going too close to the sides.

By Mr Guthrie - I am not aware that any one in particular had charge of attending to the furnace during the day time. I have seen three or four different parties putting coal on the cube - Hunter, Connors, Cooper, and Thomson. I have also put on coals myself. Connors and Hunter were always at the bottom, and gave the cube their attention, although I am not aware that they had special charge of the cube. I had other duties to attend to.

Did you see Connors and Hunter take more charge of the cube than Cooper or Thomson? - I did not know who had charge of it. I was not at the cube except at breakfast time, and at that time Thomson and Cooper were also there. I cannot speak as to what went on during the other hours of the day. For all I know the cube may have been in charge of Hunter and Connors. I believe it would be so because they were the bottomers. The only person who was present whose name I recollect, when I spoke to Cooper about the cube was Thomson, who is dead. I left the Fifeshire Main Collieries in February 1895 for a better situation and got the favour of not requiring to work a notice.

Do you seriously say you considered that the cube was a source of danger? - I never thought anything else.

Why did you remain in the pit until February 1895 if you thought it in such a dangerous condition? - I did not consider the cube dangerous to life but only to property.

With care and proper precaution was the cube not safe enough? - I never considered it safe. I did not think any man would be injured. During the time I was there no accident occurred in connection with the cube.

By Mr Atkinson - The woodwork I though likely to be set on fire by the cube was the slides. I did not anticipate that the crowns and cleading in the roof would be set on fire. The flame was directed right into the open shaft. There was a covering consisting of three cast iron plates on the cube. The firelamp was used all the time I was there. There was no covering on the firelamp but I never anticipated any trouble from it.

LOCKHART BLELOCH'S SCRAMBLE FOR LIFE.

Lockhart Bleloch, miner, Fordell, deponed - I was a miner in the pit at the time of the accident. About 2.15 p.m. on the day of the accident I was at No. 3 pit bottom, when Alexander Thomson asked me to give him a hand to put out the fire. There was a great heat at the place coming from three fires. It seemed to me that the fire was in the packing above the bars. There were three spots where I saw the fire like three candles. There was about a couple of feet between each of them. They were right above the open fire. I formed no idea at the time as to what had caused the fire. Thomson and I at once threw some water on the woodwork. We could not make the water reach the place where the fire was, and all we did seemed to do no good. In about fifteen minutes Cooper came. We had by that time used most of the water in the kettle, and Cooper ordered us to fetch more water. Two boys brought some more water. Cooper left for a little and then came back with Calderwood. By that time the fire had increased to be like a big roaring furnace. The roof was all ablaze. Before Calderwood came Thomson and I had attempted to knock out the supports in order to bring out the bars. We only managed to knock out one of the uprights. We then saw that our efforts to control the fire would be useless. I proceeded to leave the mine and met Calderwood just at the trap door between No. 2 and No. 3 pits. Thomas Sharp (who was killed) was with me. Calderwood told us to go and stop up the cross cuts, which is the only other passage in the Jersey seam leading to No. 3 pit. We went. I found a strong current of air coming from No. 2 in the direction of No. 3 pit. It was so strong that we could not keep our lamps in. We met Calderwood and we told him that we would need more assistance, and he sent for Frank Sharp. Then we started to put in the stopping. We had finished a portion of the stopping and had a screen cloth ready to put on when the air current changed. At that time smoke and dust came from No. 3 pit. We gave up the idea of proceeding with the stopping, and made for the bottom. We went along the level road to within three or four yards of the trap door, and we noticed flames on the roof. We had to go on our hands and knees and crawl along. When a little nearer the trap door Tom Sharp called out that he was choking. We had no lights, and we crawled along until we came to where our coats were, and then we knew what direction to take. Up to then the two Sharps had been crawling behind me. I don't know what became of them afterwards. The first fresh air I got was at the bottom of No. 2 pit, which was the spot we had all been making for. I found Alex. Thomson there belling down the cage. He said he was roasted. He afterwards died. He and I were taken up. There were others went up, but I don't remember whom. The Sharps did not come up, and I explained where I thought they must go. Afterwards Calderwood, Cooper, and others went down.

By Mr Guthrie - I was not burned at the time the flame appeared, nor, so far as I know, were the Sharps. Up to the time I got to my coat Thomas Sharp was quite close to me. After that I don't know what happened to them. It was a good distance before I came to my coat that he called out to me he was choking. I cannot say whether Thomson shut the gate completely or not. Neither he nor I had any light.

By Mr Atkinson - While we were working at the stopping, Calderwood came to us. While he was with us there was a slight reversal of the air current. On account of that we had to go down to the foot of the east heading. Smoke followed us. The air was very hot. We afterwards returned to the stopping. Calderwood went with us. That was about twenty minutes or so before the great rush of smoke and hot air came. Frank Sharp asked Calderwood if there was any danger working there, and Calderwood replied - "Yes, if the air reverses upon us". After the first smoke and hot air came I felt a little timorous, but not exactly afraid.

THE OPINION OF AN EXPERT.

Thomas Paterson, mining engineer, Glasgow, deponed - The fan has now, to a considerable extent superseded the cube which is usually employed in the case of shallow pits. Now, and in the case of new collieries, the ventilation fan is almost invariably adopted. The primary cost of a fan is much greater than that of a cube, but if the power of working the fan is got from the existing boilers the future expenses may not be so great as that of burning the quantity of coals a cube would require. The situation of the cube in this case was much too near the shaft for safety. There is a great danger in the use of a cube where there is woodwork near. The presence of a supply of water satisfies me that the use of the cube was considered to be attended with danger. The kettle of water was insufficient provision to stop a fire once it had broken out. If the furnace had been some yards away from the shaft, it would have been just as good for ventilation purposes and a great deal safer. The risk of fire was greatly increased by the addition of an open fire, and I would not have allowed such a thing. I never knew of such a dangerous expedient being resorted to for ventilation. Being informed that the fire appeared in three places in the roof, I am of the opinion that it must have been ignited by the sparks or overheating or flame from the fire below. The fine dust in the cleading would be very easily ignited and the woodwork also. It was ridiculous to attempt to extinguish the fire by throwing pailfuls of water on it. The metals were so soft and brittle that the shaft required timbering to keep them in their places, and of course when the timbering was consumed the metals would come down. It would naturally follow that there would be a reversal of the air current, and this would jeopardise the lives of the men in the pit. When it was found that the fire had got a hold of the woodwork, the first thing that should have been done was to have withdrawn the men from the workings. The manager should then have tried to stop the fire by shutting the mouth of the downcast shaft and after that the burning shaft. That would have smothered the fire. I think that even if the stopping which was attempted to be erected near No. 3 pit had been completed it would not have prevented the feeding of the air courses from No. 1 pit, the stopping would have had no effect at all upon the fire.

By Mr Guthrie - I have never been down a pit when it was burning. I have never had anything to do with putting out a fire in a pit, nor examined a pit immediately after there had been a fire in it.

You have had no experience whatsoever in connection with fires in pits? - I was down the Barrwood Pit, Kilsyth, six months after a fire following upon an explosion. It was necessary to flood the pit before the fire was put out. The method adopted in each case depends upon the circumstances. I have seen cubes used as a permanent method of ventilation at a great many different collieries. I am not aware of cubes being used temporarily until the best situation for a fan is being ascertained. It is generally known from the beginning where the fan should be.

In the case of the Kinneddar pit the Jersey seam is 53 fathoms, and the splint seam 61 fathoms - is that a shallow pit? - Yes, comparatively shallow, and in a pit of these depths cubes can be employed safely if properly constructed and properly used.

If there was a timber roof above the cube would it not have been more dangerous to have had the cube further away from the shaft - if there were sparks was it not safer that they should get up the shaft than lodge about the woodwork? - Oh, yes.

Was it not safer then to have the cube near the lip of the shaft? - It should have been further back and arched. Any cubes that I have seen that were not arched had a hard sandstone roof above them. These were permanent cubes. I do not think that the cube at Kinneddar was safe even as a temporary arrangement and even although it was watched. The supply of water in the neighbourhood of the cube should have been under pressure. The longer the cube was there the more ignitable would be the timber near it become. The method of attempting to erect a stopping was one that could not possibly have succeeded in putting out the fire because the burning shaft would have been fed with fresh air.

Assuming that measures were only taken while the communication between No. 2 and No. 3 was being cut off to close up the passages feeding No. 3, would that method not have succeeded? - If all the air courses had been closed up simultaneously, the fire would have been greatly diminished. It would have had the same effect as closing the mouths of the shafts.

Supposing the manager had taken steps to close up all the air courses, would you have lodged any objections? - Yes, I objected to the men being down the pit while the shaft was burning.

Is it your view that life should not be exposed to risk in an attempt to save property? - No; but I think the risk here was too great. There was a risk of the shaft collapsing at any moment after the fire had got hold of it, the air currents reversing, and the flames being thrown back upon the men.

Have you had any experience of a fall in the shaft causing a reversal of the current? - No; but from scientific knowledge I say that if a shaft collapsed the air must be reversed.

What reason was there to expect that the shaft would collapse? - It would collapse when the timber got burned.

Does the timber burn straight off? - Yes, where it has been previously dried up with continued heat.

That's been your experience, has it? - Common sense tells anyone that.

From your experience or common sense was this shaft likely to burn long before it would collapse? - Ten minutes.

Do you know that it took a great deal longer than ten minutes in this case? - It may have done. That is a matter on which people of skill will differ, and the manager was bound to act on his own judgement.

What would be the quickest method of putting out the fire? - The simultaneous closing of all the air currents would have a quicker effect on the fire than closing the mouths of the shafts. By adopting the latter method it would have been necessary to close No. 1, No. 2, and then No. 3.

How long would it have taken to do that? - With plenty of men and material it could have been done within an hour. I do not think there would have been much difficulty in closing No. 2, notwithstanding the pumping and winding machinery. The time it would take to close up the mouths of the mine would depend upon the energetic manner the work was gone about. If three or four hours elapsed before the mouths of the shafts were closed, the time would be too long. When I spoke of closing the shafts within an hour, I meant a temporary closing.

By Mr Young - If a furnace is to be used at all, it ought to be well constructed and well situated. I never saw a furnace in operation under circumstances such as were present at Kinneddar - a wooden roof. It is usual to have the roof of the cube constructed of fire-brick. I don't know of any covering of iron plates. There would be a greater radiation of heat from an iron covering than of fire-brick.

By Mr Atkinson - The risk in the first place was to property, not to life. Had I been in the Kinneddar pit on the day of the accident, I think that there would have been present in my mind the risk, if the timbers were burned, of the material behind falling and causing a reversal of air current. I don't think that the miners would realise that risk. I have had no personal experience of a reversal of the air current being brought about by a fall of debris down the shaft. I have read of such accidents occurring, however.

THE EXPLORATIONS IN THE WRECKED SHAFT.

Robert Calderwood recalled, said in answer to Mr Guthrie, that the whole of the burnt pit had been explored since the date of the fire. The only fall that appears to have taken place in the shaft is a fall from a point about 20 fathoms above the Jersey seam. An extensive fall also took place from the surface. The explorations in the shaft have not thrown any additional light on the point as to how the air current came to be reversed. Some of the witnesses have spoken of the flames from the coal. I wish to explain that very little flame comes from our coal - it is almost like anthracite coal.

By Mr Young - Why is it there is no entry of black damp in the report book for the day previous to the accident? - The book is kept by the fireman.

THE CLOSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

This concludes the evidence, and Counsel agreed to furnish the Commissioner and the Assessor with short written statements bearing on the evidence adduced.

The Court then rose.


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